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Abstract: This paper is based on fieldwork undertaken in conjunction with Green My Favela, a land use
restoration project that works with informal and vulnerable income sector residents to reclaim chronically
degraded public areas by creating gardens inside the urban favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The paper
reveals how government intervention policies employed in the lead up to the 2016 Olympics are destabilizing
the fragile social fabric of the city’s largest favela, Rocinha, through military occupation and urbanization
activities that threaten an already low and unstable human security threshold.
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1. Introduction
Brazil is a country with one of the highest economic dispar-
ities in the world, where half of the people survive on only
ten percent of the income, and more than a quarter live be-
low the federal poverty line. Rio de Janeiro is the second
largest city in Brazil—home to approximately fourteen million
people of whom approximately 27% live in dense informal or
irregular settlements (favelas) in areas that suffer from state
neglect, resource scarcity, and fluctuating levels of violence.
The Rocinha favela is a steep, heavily populated favela
located in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro. It consists of
a cluster of more than twenty neighborhoods, made up of
dozens of non-cohesive communities [1], and a myriad of
fragmented subgroups and sublocations [2]. Rocinha’s geo-
political complexity, its economic importance, and its built
density offers a rich and multilayered template for exploring
how government intervention [3] plays out on the ground to
impact on community-centered environmental restoration
(ER) and preservation efforts.
The series of case reports described below are based
on fieldwork undertaken while attempting to establish a se-
ries of micro-scale gardens in Rocinha between 2011 and
2014. The work was carried out in conjunction with Green
My Favela (GMF), an ER project that works with favela resi-
dents to remediate chronically degraded space and make
gardens inside Rio’s favelas. The projects provide a work-
ing platform from which to explore how the interventionist
actions of the state of Rio de Janeiro theoretically hold the
capacity to support small socio-environmental efforts within
Rocinha, but instead are further unraveling the already frag-
ile social fabric of a favela in distress.
The research focuses on how urbanization and police
pacification go hand in hand to affect or interface with
ER efforts located within various neighborhoods inside
Rocinha. It also describes how drug trafficking and other
intra-community conflicts, relationships, and expectations
impact on the micro-gardening projects discussed, and eval-
uates if it is feasible to cultivate productive, green public
space inside Rocinha under these conditions. It explicates
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how activities and behaviors around remediating degraded
space are impacted by a myriad of government policies,
armed conflicts, State [4] abandonment, and social exclu-
sion which interweave to define the complexity of working
in Brazil’s largest urban favela. These issues compound to
make Rocinha an extremely volatile and difficult place in
which to try to establish safe and productive public space.
Recognizing how community-centered ER efforts are im-
pacted by Rio’s pacification—which connects at the nexus
of public security, urbanization, and the ‘war on drugs’—
accordingly requires identifying the interplay of both internal
and external social inequities and power relations. How
these policies are both aimed at gaining territorial control
over favelas in order to further the interests of the ruling
class is critical to understanding whose voices Rio’s policies
serve, and whose voices are ignored in the process. This
state of affairs has been thoroughly critiqued by a diverse
range of scholars [5].
Studies which focus on the structural realities of socio-
environmental policy include scholars such as Raquel Rol-
nick, who has been influential in revealing how social in-
equities in the judicial system penalize the poor. In addition,
Gomes and Barbosa’s research focuses on urban sustain-
ability as mechanisms of control and resistance [6], and
Lucas Cavalcante’s writing examines the wider discourse
surrounding urban sustainability and policy implementation
by focusing on specific impacts and limitations of interven-
tions in some of Rio’s smaller favelas [7]. While there is also
a sizeable body of evidence available about the intercon-
nectedness of environmental vulnerabilities and resource
inequities, political promises to establish frameworks to
tackle these problems remain largely unfulfilled.
Advancing urban and socio-environmental policy is de-
fined as a key outcome of Rio’s Master Plan for Sustainable
Urban Development, as laid out in Complementary Law No.
111/2011 [8]. Specifically, under this law, the municipality
has formulated and implemented policy based on a range of
principles, including: environmental conservation and social
equity; appreciation, protection and sustainable use of the
environment; universal access to infrastructure and urban
services; promoting broad social participation; universal
access to land; cooperation between various government
bodies, the private sector and other societal sectors in the
urbanization process in compliance with social interest;
preservation of environmental areas; integrated planning
and urban management aimed at ensuring the sustainable
development of the City; coordinating the actions of all lev-
els of government to promote initiatives of common interest
concerning the environment, environmental sanitation, ur-
ban infrastructure, and public services; the urbanization
of favelas, irregular and illegal settlements, with the im-
plementation of infrastructure, sanitation, public facilities,
recreational areas and reforestation, aimed at their integra-
tion into formal areas of the City, except in the situations
of risk and environmental protection; the adoption of urban
solutions that increase the safety and avoid fragmentation
and compartmentalisation of the urban fabric; the recovery,
rehabilitation and maintenance of public open spaces built
on degraded or underutilized areas; promoting the appro-
priate use of empty or underused or idle land, prioritizing
its use as open spaces for community use, parks, green
areas and recreational areas; and promoting democratic
management of the City.
As this paper aims to demonstrate, to date the imple-
mentation of this municipal policy framework has largely
failed Rocinha. In addition, there has been little analysis
as to how these policies impact on community-centered
efforts that aim to rehabilitate degraded land. Little attention
has been paid to how these policies support or impede
specific attempts by irregular sector groups to insert them-
selves into this ER framework, or to analyze the results of
policies that are delivered in either limited or inconsistent
ways. Therefore, there is still a need to investigate (i) the
reality of socio-environmental interactions in favelas (ii) the
micro-impact of policy failure within favela communities in
regard to ER, and (iii) any potential socio-environmental pol-
icy shifts that could benefit Rocinha and other large favelas
or favela complexes like it.
2. Objectives and Scope
Enacting any form of environmental remediation inside of
almost any of Rio’s urban favelas requires overcoming a
range of socio-political, socio-economic, public security, and
geographical complexities. This presents a formidable chal-
lenge. In the context of Rocinha, where risk of conflict is
strongly perceived [9], fear and mistrust is embodied in a
range of physical and symbolic structural assemblages [10].
In addition, many forms of social interventions reinforce
the concept of colonial oppression and produce a spiral of
meanings and volatile behaviors that react to the interests
at play [11]. Accordingly, by examining what actually hap-
pens in the field, it is possible to see how environmental
restoration efforts interface with the structural inequalities
of a socially segregated city [12] where both macro and
micro conflicts are catalyzed or accelerated by events and
approaches that generate mistrust and fear.
As such, this paper seeks to bring to light the interplay
between specific social, environmental, and security chal-
lenges encountered in Rocinha during the first three years
of pacification, using the ER projects that GMF has par-
ticipated in as a field guide. The study aims to explore if
ER projects can be sustained; if they produce benefits for
residents; how State intervention impacts on these projects;
how this relates to issues associated with territorial control
and access to land; and what macro- and sub-level conflict
arises between actors as a result. Moreover, it attempts
to reveal the complex social interface of Rocinha under
pacification, and to identify incongruities in values, inter-
ests, knowledge and power relations between State and
non-State actors.
The research may be useful or of interest to those
working inside non-international internal armed conflicts,
or within the areas of public security policy, fragile cities, en-
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vironmental remediation, poverty studies, informality, urban
planning, or urban agriculture.
3. Methodology
The bulk of the qualitative information collected for this pa-
per was obtained in the course of co-producing the seven
ER/gardening projects discussed below. The research is
primarily based on material gathered from the many unstruc-
tured conversations and interactions had by the author and
other members of the GMF team while working in Rocinha
with residents to make gardens between November 2011
and March 2015. It links to the pillars of action research
in that it involves processes of collective problem solving
and engages with community efforts that are inextricably
tied to collective action [13–16]. It also interfaces with what
Bogdan and Biklen interpret as the collection of evidence
designed for the purpose of exposing unjust practices and
environmental dangers, and for assessing or recommend-
ing actions for change [17].
Crime statistics provide a source of secondary data;
however, the difficulty of obtaining reliable figures due to
underreporting made the fieldwork an important measure
for qualifying official public data [18]. By working with differ-
ent actors and various social interfaces over a prolonged
period of time, these field actions were instrumental in yield-
ing a nuanced understanding of the evolving macro- and
micro-level political structures that operate in Rocinha, and
how they differ from neighborhood to neighborhood.
The projects were located in various parts of Rocinha,
were of different sizes and types, and involved a variety of
actors [19]. The diversity of the projects provided a variety
of fields and social interfaces in which to work—in various
neighborhoods with a wide range of poverty levels; a dis-
parate array of working partners; assorted plots of degraded
land; different grades of infrastructure and resource access;
various levels of capital investment; fluctuating levels of hu-
man security; conflicting forms of armed governance; and
significant social and natural geographic variances. The
work aligned with the stated social goals of government
intervention—in particular in regard to producing the sus-
tainable social occupation of space [20].
4. Organizational Framework
GMF was used as the organizational framework through
which to approach this study because it offers a unique
structure through which to interface with many different
social planes. GMF is a locally based international organi-
zation founded by the author in 2010. It is a collaborative,
action-based ER organization and research support plat-
form that works with individual favela residents, residents’
associations, NGOs, schools, and multiple tiers of gov-
ernment, to improve existing urban space by remediating
degraded lands and making gardens. GMF works with con-
cepts of practical hands-on knowledge exchange to open
up opportunities for people, materials, ideas, and organisa-
tional assemblages to reshape space that has long been
prone to abuse and neglect. These spatial co-productions
aim to explore how the informal sector can drive and partic-
ipate in the re-generation of safe social space and improve
the daily lives of favela residents.
GMF also collaborates with a range of external part-
ners including private philanthropists, academic institutions,
grassroots organizations, research networks, artists, social
innovators, and individual researcher/practitioners working
in an array of diverse fields (including sustainability, anthro-
pology, landscape architecture, environmental ethics, the
arts and humanities, policy studies, global studies, envi-
ronmental studies, and urban planning). In addition, GMF
explores, advises on, and attempts to implement solutions
that address issues relating to garbage and recycling, food
and water security, public health and educational program-
ming inside favelas.
5. Background and Context
The history of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas began in the late
1880s with the abolition of slavery as Brazil transitioned
from the Portuguese empire to a Republic in its own right.
Throughout the course of the next century, the city’s favelas
grew and experienced significant changes. Initially, these
communities were made up of a mixture of squatter set-
tlements, farming communities, and legally parceled resi-
dential areas. In time, rural-to-urban migrants and itinerant
laborers also began to occupy favelas. As various formal
residential and industrial areas were abandoned, these
too became informal occupations. Decades of removals
of these low-income populations have also shifted urban
density from one favela to another.
As favelas became more numerous and increasingly pop-
ulated, residents began to organize, forming local associ-
ations and labor unions. These organizations served as
forums for deliberating on community matters. Since the
government failed to extend public services or legal protec-
tions to the favelas, community members, led by their local
associations, formed their own systems of transportation,
sanitation and utilities services, commerce, and governance.
Amidst the political turmoil of the 1980s, the City of Rio
de Janeiro became an important export node for cocaine
transiting from the Andes to the United States and Europe.
It also developed as an internal consumer market for the
drug. As a consequence of the evolving drug trade, levels
of violence skyrocketed. By the mid-1990s, Brazil was con-
sidered one of the world’s most violent nations not in a state
of war, and Rio’s favelas began to be compared to internal
armed conflicts.
The favelas, with their unmapped geographic complexity
and built density, and without the protection of the State, be-
came prime territory from which the drug trafficking gangs
operated. As gangs took over the control of more and more
favelas, the young men living inside their boundaries came
under intense pressure to join the trafficking culture. They
also became the principal victims of homicide, not only as
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a result of gang-related incidents, but because of the enor-
mous number of extra-judicial killings that Rio’s police have
become so infamous for. Rio’s multiple military and civil
police forces, notorious for using extreme force with almost
total impunity, were responsible for 8,466 deaths in the state
of Rio de Janeiro between 2004 and 2015. Statistics show
that, on average, four out of every five victims that die at the
hands of police are poor, black and aged between fifteen
and 29 years of age [21].
In 2006, in order to satisfy the International Olympic
Committee, Rio began to devise a series of interventionist
policies designed to overcome this violent image and offer
a more alluring and marketable picture of the city. Sev-
eral state and municipal policies and programs have since
emerged, including the Unidade de Polı´cia Pacificadora
(UPP), a state military campaign that was implemented to
secure territorial control over strategically located favelas;
and Morar Carioca (the Informal Settlements Integration
Program), an urbanization program designed as a corner-
stone of Rio’s Olympic City legacy, as laid out in the city’s
Master Plan for Sustainable Urban Development [22–25].
As a result, almost ten thousand UPP military troops
have been deployed to favelas, and R$ 8 billion has been
pledged to ‘upgrade’ and ‘integrate’ favelas into the formal
city. The favela upgrades include the installation of sanitation,
water drainage, street lighting, roads, public green spaces
and recreational areas, transportation networks, home sta-
bilization, and social service centers [26]. The UPP coordi-
nates with the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH)—the
department that oversees the city’s urbanization projects—to
facilitate the regularization of utilities and services, to shut
down informality, and to enforce housing removals.
More than delivering anything else however, Rio’s urban-
ization projects have provided an abundance of lucrative
state-backed corporate profiteering opportunities to a se-
lect few. Public contracts have been exclusively awarded
to a handful of private consortium and construction compa-
nies that, under current policies, are able to skirt normative
democratic processes under the banner of the Olympics
legacy [20]. This accelerated neoliberal policy or the “festi-
valization of politics” as Ha¨ußermann and Siebel describe
it [27]—is designed as a landscape of exceptionalities in
which favela territory is appropriated without due process
[22,28] in order to advance political and private gain.
Rather than integrating favelas, creating critical infras-
tructure, promoting community-led social projects, address-
ing unemployment, mitigating the spread of disease, provid-
ing public security and so on, these programs—at tremen-
dous public cost—have done little more than protect the
bourgeoisie and generate enormous profit for the large-
scale entrepreneurs that are the major private contributors
to the electoral campaigns of Rio’s governor and mayor
[20]. This slew of top-down interventions disguised as so-
cial investments are decided by politicians and corporate
entrepreneurs who insist “they know what is good for the
city” [22], yet for all intents and purposes they appear to be
designed to be good for themselves.
6. The Layout of Rocinha
The Rocinha favela is Rio’s most thickly populated informal
settlement, with more than twenty neighborhoods tightly
packed into less than a square kilometer of land (Figure 1).
Census reports calculate the population at 69,000 [29] but
unofficial estimates reach as high as 200,000. Whatever
the actual figure, Rocinha is the largest of Brazil’s favelas,
where most residents subsist in closely packed housing
units stacked up to eleven stories high.
This self-contained city is a compact concrete labyrinth
comprised of dark, narrow tunnels (Figure 2) and steep
winding alleys littered with mounds of garbage and snaking
grey streams of open sewerage that spill down the steep
mountainside to the ocean below. One congested main
road twists through it from top to bottom. Motorbikes ferry
residents up and down through a jumbled network of hous-
ing and commerce bubbling with lively and vivacious social
exchanges taking place in the markets, stores, bars, restau-
rants, schools, and churches.
Figure 1. Detail of Rocinha favela housing.
Figure 2. Rocinha becos (alleyways) in the Vala˜o neighbor-
hood.
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The favela is geographically squeezed in between two
of the Rio’s most affluent neighborhoods, Sa˜o Conrado and
Ga´vea. It falls almost at the bottom of the city’s Human De-
velopment Index (HDI). While the HDI of Ga´vea surpasses
that of Norway (the country with the highest-ranking HDI in
the world) a hundred yards away in Rocinha, average life
expectancy is cut by thirteen years [30].
Though living conditions in specific favelas under pacifi-
cation vary depending on context and institutional arrange-
ment, the people face common struggles that can be largely
characterized by the use of force wielded by the power of
the State—wherein vertical public policies deliberately si-
lence residents and leave little room for effective community
participation—through the naturalization of structural inequal-
ity that is a deliberate extension of historical segregation [31].
7. Control and Security in the Favela
The majority of Rio’s favelas are governed by “micro-level
warlords” [32] that control the three major gangs that mo-
nopolize Rio’s lucrative drug trafficking economy. Rocinha
plays a major part of this trafficking landscape. It has been
suggested that as much as R$ 100 million is generated
from the drug trade annually in this favela alone [33].
For decades, Rocinha was governed by a succession of
drug trafficking bosses and gangs, each of which resulted
in a series of violent events that dictated the course of traf-
ficking in the community. In 2004, Antonio Bonfim Lopes,
known simply as Nem, took control of the favela to govern
under the banner of the Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) gang.
Under Nem, Rocinha functioned in relative peace and unity.
Nem was considered somewhat of a benevolent leader who
was rumored to have entered the drug trade as a way to
pay for his baby daughter’s critical health care needs (she
suffered from a rare blood disease). Nem won the respect
of many residents by establishing a series of community
services such as food banks.
At the beginning of Rocinha’s pacification in Novem-
ber 2011, however, thousands of state anti-terrorist military
units moved into Rocinha on masse—in foot battalions, with
dogs, and on horseback, supported with armored tanks
and helicopters. Nem was arrested and many of his senior
dealers were killed. Consequently, the ADA heirarchy crum-
bled and traffickers splintered into sub-groups, which has
sparked an internal conflict for control of territory. Though
700 UPP officers are now stationed in Rocinha, operating
out of several military posts which control the most accessi-
ble parts of the favela, the ADA is still a major drug trafficking
force to contend with, despite their internal turmoil.
Currently the ADA leadership of Rocinha is unified under
Roge´rio Avelino da Silva, the drug boss known as Roge´rio
157. Since pacification, the ADA has reestablished a sig-
nificant presence in at least six neighborhoods, including
the Vala˜o, Cachopa, Macega, and Porto Vermelho. How-
ever, many ‘soldiers’ and ‘managers’ are restless under
Roge´rio’s leadership. This has triggered several factional
takeover attempts that manifest in unpredictable and in-
tense exchanges of gunfire. Therefore, Rocinha residents
not only endure battles between the UPP and the ADA,
and between the ADA and the CVs (who vie for control of
the upper reaches of the favela), but also between compet-
ing factions within the ADA. Adding to the instability, the
UPP have also been accused of corruption, torture, drug
trafficking, rape, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances.
The UPP is expected to remain an implemented policy at
least until the realization of the Olympic Games. However, as
the state sinks deeper and deeper into a negative economic
growth crisis, together with the loss of the UPP’s principal
funders [34], pacification looks less and less viable over the
long-term. It is generally assumed that the policy will be,
in large part, dismantled after the Games, leaving a power
vacuum that is likely to lead to extensive bloodshed as drug
trafficking factions compete to reestablish territorial control.
8. Understanding Urbanization
Along with the military intervention of pacification, Rocinha
was granted federal investment funding of R$ 231.2 million
to be directed toward urbanization interventions that were
contracted to private enterprises to provide infrastructure,
housing and community facilities, and to recover degraded
areas [35]. The funding was assigned to Brazil’s Growth
Acceleration Program (PAC) and dispensed in part by the
state and the municipality.
Urbanization projects often begin with the removal of resi-
dents from their homes. Scholars Luke Faulhaber and Lena
Azevedo estimate that more than 65,000 people, mostly from
low-income areas and informal settlements, have been evicted
in the lead up to the Olympics, many forcibly and through vio-
lent processes [36]. Yet the city continues to defend its hous-
ing policy and denies compulsory removal without guarantee
of a new home or compensation by negotiated resettlement
[37]. Even so, the Municipal Court of Auditors has found the
SMH legally responsible for failing to pay compensation to
families in Rocinha [38]. And though Rio’s Mayor, Eduardo
Paes, directs critics to a government web portal that details the
transparency of the policy as it effects each neighborhood, the
data sets consist of nothing more than empty fields. Therefore,
any access to technical reports, the number of expropriations,
the cost of resources, the number of removed families, and
where they have been relocated to, remains obscured [39].
City Hall justifies many removals through claims of safe-
guarding residents that are geologically at-risk of landslide.
The threats are calculated by the municipal ‘Geo-Rio’ pro-
gram, which surveyed and identified six high geo-risk areas
in Rocinha [40] and subsequentaly designated the removal
of 543 families and the demolition of their homes [41,42].
According to a 2014 human rights violation report, evictions
happen without community discussion, and without residents
having access to information that justifies the need for their
removal [43]. In addition, the demolitions leave abandoned,
semi-bulldozed ruins and piles of rubble in their wake which
become areas that present an array of public health and
safety risks as well as leaving families homeless (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Demolished housing, Macega neighborhood of
Rocinha.
Removals are also premised on protecting forested con-
servation areas. In 2008, 182 favelas encroached on, or
were found to be located within 400 meters of protected
environmental areas (APAs). Between 2003–2008 Rocinha
expanded into its neighboring APA by 4.34%. In 2009, ac-
cording to technical estimates by City Hall, there were at
least 850 homes in the Vila Verde and Macega neighbor-
hoods of Rocinha that needed to be removed because they
were located in Sa˜o Conrado’s Area of Ecological Inter-
est. In Macega, according to the municipality, at least 50
houses had been built in the APA in a number of months.
However Leonardo Rodrigues Lima, spokesperson for the
Pro-Improvement of Rocinha Union, denied the claim, stat-
ing that “Of course in Rocinha there are people in risk
areas surviving in miserable conditions. But there are no
shacks in the environmental area”. Instead, he claims, it
is the affluent formal residents of Sa˜o Conrado and Gavea
whose mansions impede on the forest [44]. Though the
problem of eating into the Atlantic rainforest is important to
address, City Hall’s solution—to build a series of ‘eco-walls’
around the favela to contain it—has been heavily criticized,
with comparisons being drawn between Rio and Israel’s
Segregation Wall. The construction of the walls also in-
volves removals of families, which in turn has led to more
unsustainable development in other parts of the Atlantic
Rainforest as people rebuild where they can.
The spatial restructuring of Rocinha is also subject to
other crises. PAC invested R$ 219.3 million in infrastructure
projects in Rocinha, yet due to overspending, work ground
to a halt in 2011 [44], leaving half-finished projects aban-
doned. Construction sites and semi-completed buildings
have become squats for people in need of housing [45],
while the lack of basic sanitation and education continue
to remain critical problems. Rocinha’s community leaders
have appealed to federal prosecutors to investigate the
State Secretary for Works (responsible for implementing
PAC projects) for spending on low priority projects which
were either not completed or were hurriedly opened to co-
incide with elections. Some residents were initmidated by
PAC to leave their homes without being compensated fairly,
and as a result they have had to accept a much lower
standard of living. As the PAC projects failed to advance,
their abandoned homes, some of which had belonged to
the same family for generations, were taken over by drug
dealers and addicts [46].
Many question the nature of Rocinha’s upgrade inter-
ventions and their ability to fulfill residents’ needs without
creating unnecessary negative impact. Jose´ Martins de
Oliveira, founder of Rocinha sem Fronteiras (Rocinha with-
out Borders), reflects the sentiment of Rocinha residents
by making the point that, more than anything, upgrades
need to focus on improving sanitation conditions in order to
reduce diseases such as tuberculosis, dengue, zika, and
hepatitis, all of which present substantial health problems
in Rocinha [47,48].
9. Greening the Favela in a Climate of Risk
The opportunity to work in various locations throughout
Rocinha has provided a unique position from which to ex-
amine issues relating to both the social and military inter-
ventions brought about by pacification. If the attempts at
creating urban gardens discussed below can be broadly un-
derstood as fragile negotiations between space and conflict,
then they can help expose the fundamental spatial-political
incongruities in Rocinha at this time. These projects re-
veal the duplicitous policies and concealed patterns that
working in these circumstances present. They also point to
how contributing to reshaping public space could potentially
serve as a way to forge, modify and expand community
experience and affiliations.
For the purposes of this report, the processes involved
in creating community gardens in Rocinha are activities
that can be generally characterized as attempts to produce
various forms of productive green space. The benefits of
the provision of parks [49], the therapeutic activities re-
lated to gardening [50], and the gains presented by urban
agriculture in underserved communities [51] are all well
documented. The production of desirable and publically
accessible green space holds the potential to strengthen
mental health, provide therapeutic support, build capac-
ity, encourage cooperation, exchange knowledge, cultivate
inclusivity, and reduce poverty, yet inside informal urban
settlements such as Rocinha, residents are often deprived
of such opportunities.
The cultivation of productive green space, as a viable
urban poverty intervention strategy has been thoroughly
discussed in much literature from the 1960s on. Studies
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have been carried out, particularly in relation to the socio-
economic benefits of urban agriculture in various categories,
including home production systems and open space loca-
tions [52]. However, scholarly texts that specifically discuss
urban agriculture in the inner-city favelas of Rio are rela-
tively few [53–57]. In addition, though studies have been
conducted in relation to conflict resolution regarding rural
land tenure [58], there are few studies that pay attention to
the interface between gardening and its relationship to terri-
torial conflict inside fragile informal urban contexts [59,60].
Concerns about undernutrition, cancer, heart disease,
diabetes, asthma, obesity, depression, and emotional stress
in urban populations are growing. Diminished decision-
making capacity is also beginning to appear in studies as a
consequence of poverty, with far-reaching effects [61–63].
In informal settlements, these problems are enormous and
demand multi-level responses [64].
With an estimated one billion more people expected to
be living in informal poverty conditions within the next twenty
years, a primary concern is food security. Urban farming offers
informal communities huge benefits. In Rio, where food prices
can jump as much as 17% in a month, reducing this vulnera-
bility to the market is extraordinarily valuable for low-income
earners living in a state of economic instability [56].
The relief brought through therapeutic and educational
resources that gardens provide has been shown to be bene-
ficial to physical and mental health. Parks and gardens are
increasingly valued for their restorative qualities. Significant
benefits have been proven to be associated with having
access to nature, including its ability to relieve stress and
cultivate a sense of stewardship for the land. Psychologically
there is satisfaction that comes from the joy of growing and
sharing food. These activities can contribute to relationship
building that, in turn, can lead to community cohesion and
enhanced levels of belonging. This is connected to building
social capital [65,66], an important aspect of wellbeing that
encourages cooperation among individuals and groups, and
an essential component of a functioning society [67].
The physical benefits just from being able to view gar-
dens are measurable in reduced blood pressure, diminished
pain levels, fewer physical complaints, and accelerated heal-
ing [67]. Community gardens have also become recognized
as an important means with which to recover from or cope
with conflict and war [68]. So what does it mean to green
even ten square meters of Brazil’s most densely populated
favela? Can such projects offer opportunities to learn about
environmental education, gain a better understanding of
nutrition, enhance food security, reduce pollution, mitigate
erosion, or improve social space—and can such space be
sustained in a climate of conflict and risk?
10. GMF Field Actions Report
The field actions described below are collaborative projects
conducted by GMF over a three-year period. They generally
follow the same production format, to:
1. identify an available site;
2. establish relationships with favela residents, local
stakeholders, and external partners (step 1. and 2.
may be reversed or happen simultaneously);
3. obtain relevant permissions with various state and
non-state actors (including gang authorization) to
move forward;
4. coordinate human, physical and financial resources;
5. engage in collaborative actions to create food, medic-
inal, or therapeutic gardens;
6. transition management to residents;
7. provide ongoing support if requested.
Once access to a site has been gained, the work begins
by clearing trash (Figure 4). The first and most fundamental
step of creating a community garden in the favela is the
removal of tons of trash and housing debris. This is often
the most challenging work, to remove massive amounts of
garbage and rubble manually by carrying it up or down long,
winding, slippery and narrow, tunnel-like becos (alleyways;
Figure 2). To trek through this 80+ year old, steep, densely
packed favela with heavy loads of everything from the re-
mains of collapsed or bulldozed housing to old appliances
and bags of heavy waste, to and from areas reachable
only on foot, requires great effort and considerable physical
labor, and can at times pose a threat to personal security.
Once a site has been cleared and cleaned up, infras-
tructure is built—terraces, retaining walls, fences, garden
beds—and water tanks installed. Soil, seeds and tools are
provided, irrigation systems are set up, compost and worm
bins are assembled. Advice on organic agriculture, com-
posting, and children’s workshops and planting days are
held. Once a garden is fully established and the community
feels ready to fully take over governance and maintenance
of a space, GMF steps away from the project and contin-
ues to provide adjunct support and resources upon request.
The projects rely to a lesser extent on capital investment
in hard infrastructure, and more on social infrastructure
(human and social capital) as the critical assets needed to
produce and maintain gardens.
Figure 4. Trash littering the ground in Macega.
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10.1. Vala˜o
Groundbreaking on the first garden in Rocinha began in
November 2011 at the same time as the UPP occupation of
the favela began to unfold. GMF’s pilot project was a garden
called Rocinha Mais Verde. The garden is located in the
Vala˜o neighborhood, one of the poorest communities in the
favela, located at the bottom of Rocinha where the bulk of
the open sewers flow. The Vala˜o is a crowded, narrow and
winding warren of cramped concrete residential structures
built on top of one another so densely that little sunlight pen-
etrates in many areas. The majority of the favela sewerage
channels to this area. The sewers are clogged with litter and
overflow during heavy downpours. Animal feces and trash
cover the narrow pathways. The more open, accessible ar-
eas of the neighborhood are brimming with commerce and
markets. Before pacification, this included bocas (street
stalls that sell drugs, mostly cocaine), guarded by young
teenage soldiers armed with heavy artillery. Since paci-
fication, the bocas have disappeared into the nooks and
crannies of the back alleyways, and the police now visibly
display the heavy weaponry and regulate mobility through
the more accessible parts of the neighborhood.
The Rocinha Mais Verde garden was Rocinha’s first
community garden. The project developed as a collabo-
ration between GMF and the late Lino dos Santos Filho
(Tio Lino), an important community leader who worked in
Rocinha for more than 30 years to make art from recycled
materials with children, with the aim of deterring them from
joining drug gangs [69].
Tio Lino had gained access to a steep, vacant lot of land
around 50 m2 that had been used for years as a garbage
dump. The land was adjacent to Tio’s NGO—Rocinha
Mundo da Arte—on a plot belonging to the Alegria das
Crianc¸as Creche. A two meter high pile of trash had built
up on top of the site and another two meters had been
compressed into the soil (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Trash buildup in the soil at the Rocinha Mais
Verde space.
With funding from a private philanthropist, the physical
help of 14 international volunteers, the children from Tio
Lino’s NGO, and a resident worker from Rocinha, GMF
began transforming the space the week the UPP occupa-
tion began. First, the garbage was painstakingly hauled
away. Some materials were repurposed, including bricks
that were used to build a series of terraces, steps, pathways,
and garden beds (Figure 6). The remaining trash was pried,
sifted and raked out of the topsoil, which was then tested by
Brazil’s federal soil research facility, Empresa Brasileira de
Pesquisa Agropecua´ria for nutrient and toxicity values. The
soil was enriched with organic fertilizer, earthworms, and
mulch. Trash was removed from a contaminated, under-
ground water tank that then was cleaned and sealed. Pipes
were laid to a new water supply that linked to city water. A
compost pile was created, worm bins set up, and a simple
homemade drip irrigation system was devised and installed
by a resident using recycled plastic bottles.
Flowers, shrubs, fruit trees, and organic edibles were
planted with the children from Tio Lino’s art school. These
hands-on educational workshops also included painting and
drawing vegetables, studying seeds under microscopes and
through magnifying glasses, tasting vegetables and taking
them home to their families, and making terrariums from
discarded plastic bottles planted with herbs.
Establishing security and governance over Rocinha
Mais Verde proved to be complex. The project unfolded dur-
ing the largest political upheaval the favela had ever seen,
and the stress on the community was palpable. The garden
brought attention from all sectors—police, residents, traffick-
ers, government, and the international community. Progress
became heavily influenced by security issues. First, the
ADA traffickers had to approve and support the project.
Then the head of the social arm of the UPP requested a
meeting with GMF, which posed a huge security risk, and so
was evaded. It has since been alleged that some of those
who liaised with police during the early stages of the UPP
occupation have been killed in gang retribution actions [70].
Others have been punished or intimidated by community
members for their interactions with police.
Figure 6. Terracing Rocinha Mais Verde.
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The location of the project in the Vala˜o was a priority for
police intervention during the initial phase of pacification. The
military takeover of the favela was led by the Batalha˜o de
Operac¸o˜es Policiais Especiais (BOPE) troops, who are infa-
mous for their aggressive military tactics. At the beginning of
the military occupation, both gardeners and children were intim-
idated by BOPE patrols. Security proved not simply an issue for
police verses traffickers, but for the community as a whole. The
threat amplified the community’s conflicting feelings towards
the practicality of cultivating public space. Despite their anxiety,
however, community stakeholders chose to continue to move
forward with the project amidst the chaos and uncertainty.
By June 2012 the daily governance of the space was fully in
the hands of the art school, with GMF continuing to provide ad-
junct support to the project. The local resident who had worked
with the project from the beginning was hired to maintain the
garden and work with the children. GMF interns from an in-
ternational environmental studies program from the University
of California Santa Cruz, on exchange at PUC University in
Rio, augmented the environmental education programming and
created a planting schedule. The garden became a space that
produced a range of herbs and seasonings, edible vegetables,
flowering ornamentals, and fruit. More importantly, it developed
as a therapeutic garden, learning space, an art space for chil-
dren, and a space for local residents to visit (Figure 7). In total,
around 200 people began interacting in or visiting the space.
Rocinha Mais Verde was subsequently showcased at the
2012 United Nations Rio+20 Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment as an outstanding example of sustainable design.[66]
During the summit, GMF began advising Rio’s State Depart-
ment of Social Assistance and Human Rights to strategize
on garbage collection, recycling policy, and programming
inside Rocinha’s public schools. As interest in the project
grew, GMF began attending community meetings inside the
favela, and identifying other spaces to work in [71].
Over the next two years, the project received much atten-
tion and flourished as a recreational and educational space
where children participated in gardening-related activities (Fig-
ure 8). Within Tio’s NGO, however, conflict began arising over
issues of control and structure as a new director began re-
defining the organization. Relations between the NGO and the
creche (the landowners of the garden) also began to strain.
R$ 8,000 was awarded to the Rocinha Mais Verde project
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to
continue work in the garden. The money was channelled
through Rocinha Mundo da Arte, but rather than generating
enthusiasm, the grant set off a series of internal power strug-
gles within the NGO. The competition for control over the
newly acquired financial resources interfered with the ability
of the NGO to focus on the task at hand, and resulted in the
money being absorbed into the organization. This damaged
relations between stakeholders. Later, Tio handed over the
maintenance of the garden to the creche, which profited from
it through a municipal grant they received to upkeep the space.
As a consequence, the creche began to perceive outside par-
ticipation as a potential threat to its funding. When the source
of this funding ended, the garden fell into disrepair.
Figure 7. Rocinha Mais Verde.
Figure 8. Children’s workshop at Rocinha Mais Verde.
In mid 2014, the project suffered a further setback with
63 year-old Tio Lino passing due to health complications
relating to his diabetes, a condition that he had battled for
years. Though Tio’s legacy and organization was passed
on to his family, it suffered a devastating loss of leadership
and vision. A further two years on, the NGO and the creche
continue to struggle for symbolic control over the project,
as the garden continues to suffer.
This scenario reflects a level of inter- and intra-
community conflict between individuals that is seen fre-
quently in Rocinha. A lack of individual or group trust,
coupled with an inability to resolve internal conflict may,
in part, be due to the link between poverty and reduced
cognitive function and decision-making ability [72]. The
perceived scarcity of external funds may also be partially
attributable to this sort of investment being so foreign to
stakeholders. Other hardships, including the regular threat
of armed conflict and the deeply established culture of drug
trafficking, has also had a detrimental effect on individuals
in their ability to deescalate conflict, feel comfortable with
risk-taking, and apply clear thinking [73].
Studies indicate that the threat and anxiety associated
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with such an increased cognitive load can hinder the pro-
cessing of information, which in turn can impact on individual
task performance [74]. Adding to this, individuals may per-
ceive intra-community conflict between members of a group
or groups as a challenge to their own capabilities or compe-
tencies [75]. This sort of intra-community conflict has been
well documented in the studies of Carnevale and Probst [76].
Jehn and Bendersky [73] have further explored this scenario
within group interactions by examining how group conflict nar-
rows attention spans and inhibits integrative problem-solving
abilities. Instead, group members are likely to respond to
group conflicts by focusing on the turmoil rather than advanc-
ing the work. The consequences are that conflict impairs
group performance, innovation, and work satisfaction [77].
Another issue Tio Lino’s death brings to light in relation
to the sustainability of these projects is the health of core in-
dividual partipants. This plays a major role in whether or not
these projects can remain viable over the long term. There
are many inequalities that contribute to the health and health-
care crises suffered by people, especially the elderly, who
live in Rio’s favelas. Most notably they have considerably
lower life expectancy. Men, on average, live 12.8 years less
than their counterparts in the formal neighborhoods that sur-
round them. Even more shocking, for both men and women
older than age 65 years, healthy life expectancy in favelas is
less than half when compared to Rio’s wealthiest sector [78].
A variety of environmental issues connected to the open
sewer and the built density also raises the public health risk
of contracting dengue [79] and tuberculosis [80], both of
which are substantially more prevalent in Rocinha than any-
where else in the state. If ill health befalls project custodians
or key actors, the health of social projects such as these can
also be jeopardised. As Janice Perlman concludes from her
work in favelas, “patterns of context, attitudes, behavior, and
luck play out in the struggle to overcome the exclusion and
dehumanization of poverty” [81].
Due to security constraints, it has not been possible to
develop other projects in the Vala˜o. Four years into the
pacification, the area remains one of the most volatile neigh-
borhoods in Rocinha. As of the time of this writing, tensions
between trafficking factions, the UPP, and the BOPE teams
that continue to patrol the area often result in exchanges of
gunfire [82]. As a consequence of the collapse in the traffick-
ing hierarchy, opposing factions vie for control of the drug
trade in this neighborhood, adding to the incidents of armed
conflict. In addition, since 2013, traffickers have established
periodic curfews that are publicly announced by ADA foot
soldiers who walk through the Vala˜o shouting for residents to
go inside in preparation for what has come to be known as ‘a
shootout at an agreed upon time’. With the bocas continuing
to collect approximately R$ 30,000 per month in drug sales,
many consider it an economy still worth fighting for [83].
10.2. Cachopa
The second project GMF orchestrated in Rocinha was
revitalizing a garden in a thin triangle of land located along
a well-traveled, steep and winding alleyway connecting
Cachopa–a crowded neighborhood perched on a partic-
ularly steep hillside—to Rocinha’s main road, Estrada da
Ga´vea. Though it receives little sunlight and measures only
six meters square, this little plot has a dramatic view of Dois
Irma˜os mountain and forms the scenery for hundreds of res-
idents’ journeys to and from work each day. Water pipes run
just below the surface of the soil, which is critically eroded,
and one side of the plot is a sheer drop-off. GMF worked
with the neighbors of this abandoned lot to remediate the
space. Trash was cleared and soil was brought in. Flow-
ers, groundcover, herbs, and shade trees were planted in
containers, crates and vertical planters. Vegetable and fruit
vines were trained along the fence. A mural was painted on
the wall, mirrored tiles were used as an aesthetic device and
to increase the amount of sunlight the space received, and
a worm bin was installed to process food scraps (Figure 9).
Initially the neighbors were estranged from one another,
but the interactions that occurred through the activity of
gardening opened up a relationship that involved not only
material production but the exchange of ideas and emotions,
which evolved into a social practice and created an opening
for shared cultural experience. This laid the groundwork for
fostering a form of solidarity, in that it created a willingness
for neighbors to take the risk of helping each other through
taking on an informal form of public responsibility [84]. The
importance of this is that it formed the basis for trust, co-
operation, and new social ties. The garden requires little
maintenance, and though it has suffered some physical set-
backs (a paint spill from another neighbor’s house and the
theft of some edibles), it continues to receive regular upkeep
from its neighbors. Due to the heavy foot traffic that moves
through the area, the space continues to earn a positive
response from the general public. Over time however, the
general social stability of the neighborhood has deteriorated.
Figure 9. Resident creating a trellis on the fence at the Pedac-
inho da Terra garden in the Cachopa neighborhood of Rocinha.
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In early 2015, traffickers retook control of some parts
of Cachopa [85] and the security situation became critically
unstable. In February 2014, 60 traffickers armed with assault
rifles attacked Cachopa’s UPP post, injuring both the unit’s
general coordinator and its commander. The conflict spilled
over into the Vala˜o. Transformers, cars, surveillence cam-
eras, and power generators were shot out, grenades were
thrown, and tires were set on fire on the freeway at the en-
trance to the favela, causing the closure of Zuzu Angel tunnel
which connects the districts of Sa˜o Conrado and Gavea [86].
In addition, in September 2013 a nine year old girl was
found raped and murdered in a vacant lot not more than a
hundred meters from the Pacifying Police Unit in Cachopa
[87], and in July 2014, a young woman was raped at gun-
point by a trafficker as she was walking home [88]. These
actions in particular, demonstrate how the rule of gang
law—that strictly forbade any form of sexual assault, theft
or domestic violence—is no longer in place. Brutal as it
may have been, the ‘law of the favela’ did function as a way
to regulate and control social behavior. This has clearly
dissolved under the UPP and the further destabilization of
social order has disabled any opportunity to build social
capital. The quality and extent of social interactions possi-
ble under the current security situation has shaped a daily
norm whereby social cohesion cannot prosper.
10.3. Porto Vermelho
The Parque Ecolo´gico da Rocinha (Ecological Park of
Rocinha) was the focus of a cluster of GMF projects which
began in August 2012. The R$ 24 million invested by the
State Fund for Environmental Conservation and Urban De-
velopment to finance the park was an attempt to provision
for the APA at the boundary of Rocinha, and in doing so
quell the backlash the State received after building a series
of three meter high ‘eco-walls’ through the neighborhood
to physically contain the area [89]. With a stated goal of
arresting deforestation through the prevention and removal
of housing in areas at risk of landslide, the government
proposed building fifteen kilometers of these cement walls
around fourteen of the city’s favelas.
However, after the walls drew intense international crit-
icism a new plan was needed to resell the concept to the
public. In Rocinha, this involved designing the 9,000 m2
ecological park. With impressive culture and leisure facili-
ties [90], the park was to be nestled within in a small wedge
of Atlantic rainforest between the Porta˜o Vermelho, Labori-
aux, and Cobras e Lagartos neighborhoods of the favela.
The eco-walls would function to delineate park boundaries
and to protect the Mata Atlaˆntica (Atlantic Forest) APA area.
The Atlantic Forest is one of the most diverse biomes in the
world, yet it is critically endangered with only seven percent
of original forest remaining. In the 25 years preceding the
construction of Rio’s first eco-wall in 2009, the state had
lost 176,714 hectares of this fragile ecosystem [44].
The problems that manifest at the remote boundaries of
the favela present many practical, ethical, political, health
and security dilemmas. The dense vegetation and remote
isolation of the areas at the edges of Rocinha provide seclu-
sion and escape routes for drug traffickers, making them
precarious and dangerous. Many believe this was the pri-
mary reason behind the construction of the walls in the first
place—to fence in the drug trade. State lawmaker Marcelo
Freixo claims the government’s strategy in building the walls
was not to protect the forest but rather “to control poor com-
munities” in order to appease the middle and upper classes.
Further, though poverty may be linked to deforestation and
habitat loss, it cannot be isolated from political and gover-
nance issues. Though there are an estimated 210 irregular
constructions in Rocinha’s APA, with a 300,000 low-income
housing deficit crisis in Rio, Freixo believes that people
living in favelas should not be blamed for the problem of
deforestation. Additionally, the SOS Mata Atlantica Foun-
dation draws attention to the fact that the forest is not only
impacted by the expansion of favelas, but by the luxury
condominiums, homes and hotels that continue to encroach
on it with almost total impunity [91].
Raquel Rolnick [92] also believes the issue of deforesta-
tion is prejudice against the poor and points to judicial deci-
sions to back up her claim. Rolnick cites several cases where
judges have ordered the demolition of favela housing, yet
have protected mansions that invade forested areas on the
argument that the financial investment made in these expen-
sive buildings cannot be ignored. For example, Rolnick claims
that in the space of one week in 2013, two judgments were
made, one determining the necessity for removal of favela
housing for environmental reasons, and the other determin-
ing that residents of two luxury condominiums in Ga´vea—in
undisputed violation of the Forest Code—could remain [93].
The social isolation that already existed at this bound-
ary of the favela has been exasperated by the extensive
removal of families, first in order to construct the wall, and
subsequently to create the eco-park. Though the project
initially received community support and employed the ma-
jority of its construction workers from Rocinha, 181 families
were consequently relocated in order for the massive PAC-
led project to move forward [94]. Lead architect of the park,
Cafe´ Anderson, rationalizes the removals by emphasising
the high levels of built density and poverty in this neighbor-
hood, which creates elevated health and safety risks for the
local population [95].
GMF’s involvement in the park began by working with
elderly residents, who lived by the entrance to the park, to
plant a vertical garden on a stretch of retaining wall mea-
suring 45 meters in length and three meters in height [96].
Each of the 1,000+ bricks in the wall were filled with soil
and compost and used as planters for a range of ornamen-
tals, medicinal herbs, fruits, seasonings, succulents, and
hanging vines. Residents who lived adjacent to the gar-
den protected and maintained the space until it became
self-sustaining. Though the garden has suffered small set-
backs from time to time, it has managed to regenerate itself
and continues to flourish (Figure 10). UPP troops use this
wall as a lookout point, and though having armed troops
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patrolling the wall with M16s during the planting process
made it a somewhat surreal and uncomfortable process, it
did not pose a major disruption to the project.
The next task GMF embarked upon came at the re-
quest of Caio, a construction supervisor who owns a mid-
rise mixed use building next to one of the park boundaries.
Caio’s five storey home rises up to overlook the park on one
side and Sa˜o Conrado’s impressive oceanfront skyline on
the other. The ground floor functions as a rental garage for
six to eight vehicles worth R$ 280 per parking space, and
his newly finished top floor boasts a small self-contained
studio apartment which fetches R$ 780 in monthly rental
fees. Multi-storey buildings such as Caio’s have become
more profitable under pacification, catalysing gentrification
and stimulating a vertical housing construction boom, de-
spite a 2011 legal decree prohibiting new vertical private
construction in the favela [97].
Caio’s family live on the residential floors of his building.
The master bedroom faces the park and receives little direct
sunlight. Its walls are covered in thick black mold, the smell
of which hangs heavy in the air and presents the potential
threat of tuberculosis. TB is contracted by breathing in bac-
teria that survive in airborne suspension for several hours in
small rooms without fresh air or sunlight. Brazil occupies 17th
place within the group of 22 countries that account for 80%
of the world’s tuberculosis cases. The state of Rio de Janeiro
has the highest number of people infected by TB nationally,
and Rocinha has the largest number of tuberculosis cases
in the state, with the disease effecting 372 people out of ev-
ery 100,000—eleven times higher than the national average
(2015) [98]. Moreover, the Cobras e Lagartos neighborhood,
where the eco-park is located, has the highest incidents of
TB in the favela, and therefore, in Brazil.
In an effort which served to open up the space behind
Caio’s building, a plan was crafted to establish a fruit and
vegetable garden directly opposite the property against the
eco-wall (Figure 11). GMF cleared the area and removed a
sizeable amount of rubble. The soil was tilled and prepared
for planting, but ironically the project stalled when it was
discovered that park regulations prohibited the fencing in of
the garden. As a consequence, Caio understandably chose
not to move forward with the project. To grow an unfenced
vegetable garden in an area where there were not enough
neighbors to watch over it made the project impractical. In-
stead the space now grows native shrubs and trees.
At the invitation of the park’s lead architect, Cafe´ Ander-
son, GMF then began to develop a large trilateral section of
the park. With the same problem of having no residents to
directly watch over the space, GMF decided to design the
large terraced area as a wild food forest where the public
could forage for food—a common practice in favelas. Local
residents helped clear the land for GMF to plant a range of
fast-growing fruit trees, vegetable vines, and other hardy
food types that could survive without maintenance. Groups
of children also brought seeds from their favorite fruit trees
to plant. Park workers watched over the gardens for a time;
however, due to a variety of issues, including restricted ac-
cess, a critical budget shortfall, and the failure of the state
to fund park maintenance, they were unable to continue
and the park began to fall into isolation and disrepair.
Plans for the park started suffering setbacks as early
as November 2012. The mismanagement of construction
funds resulted in a 30% cost overrun, and eventually PAC
abandoned its work unfinished [99]. In addition by March
2013, the UPP, whose headquarters are located in the park,
had begun prohibiting access to a large section of it, includ-
ing most of its leisure facilities and nature walks.
In July that year, Amarildo de Souza, a 42 year old res-
ident bricklayer, ‘disappeared’ from UPP headquarters. It
was later discovered that de Souza was killed while being
interrogated by the UPP. The police allegedly used electric
shocks and waterboarding on the victim before suffocating
him with a plastic bag. Testimonials by residents claim that
de Souza’s body was disposed of inside the park. A total
of 25 UPP police officers were subsequently arrested and
charged with de Souza’s torture and the concealment of his
corpse. In the months that followed de Souza’s disappear-
ance, more than 22 Rocinha residents filed reports of being
tortured at the same UPP headquarters in the six months
preceding his disappearance [100].
Figure 10. Planting a vertical garden with residents near
the entrance to Rocinha’s ecopark as UPP officers look on
during their patrol.
Figure 11. GMF at work in the ecopark, the ‘eco/segregation
wall’ in the background.
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To date, the park remains uncompleted, dangerous, and
rarely frequented by residents. A chronically eroded dirt
access road makes it difficult and dangerous to transit, a
place where pedestrians and motorists alike percieve to be
at risk, and where parents are fearful for their children to
walk. With a lack of street lighting, and the UPP headquar-
ters where Amarildo was tortured and killed, residents do
not feel safe.
Since 2015, citizens groups have periodically attempted
to engage the public in using the space and claiming respon-
sibility for its maintenance. However, with many facilities
being abandoned without completion, addressing the park’s
deficits is challenging. In addition, residents remain terrified
to walk the path that leads past the UPP. Instead of this won-
derful area providing a space for family entertainment, for
playing sports, or for enjoying cultural activities, the park has
become an ominous threat, and largely useless to the people
of Rocinha. Set in stunning nature, with some of the most
beautiful views of the city, PAC’s Ecological Park of Rocinha
should be one of the jewels of the city. However, with so
many shortcomings, the space sits desolate, falling apart,
and avoided by residents. If nothing else, the ecological park
is emblematic of the disturbing and complex reality of state
intervention as it moves aggressively forward in Rocinha.
10.4. The Laboriaux
The Laboriaux neighborhood of Rocinha is located above
the eco-park and has spectacular views of the city
(Figure 12). Approximately 4,000 people live in this historic
area, one of the favela’s more affluent neighborhoods. The
Laboriaux was originally settled in the early 1930s, when
land was given away by a local politician who used it to buy
votes. A further 80 plots were parceled out by a local real
estate company and formally sold. By 1937, however, de-
velopment had stalled and by the end of the decade formal
infrastructure had been abandoned and the neighborhood
began taking shape as an informal settlement.
Due to the steepness of the neighborhood, landslides have
been a problem in the Laboriaux, but the community remains
suspicious of the intentions behind attempts by the city to force
their evictions as formal real estate development threatens to
advance forcefully in this area. Many residents have already
had their homes demolished and been compelled to move.
Others, however, have successfully fought relocation and have
secured the right to stay in their homes [101].
At the beginning of 2013, GMF was invited to collaborate
with the Municipal Secretary of the Environment’s Hortas Car-
iocas program to develop a mid-size food garden in the La-
boriaux. The project was funded in part by an urban planner
from Columbia University who received a Davis Peace Grant
to work with GMF on the space. The right to use the land was
approved by the State Department of Human Rights and Social
Assistance (SEASDH)—the social arm of the UPP at the time.
Though residents of the immediate area had been re-
moved from their homes, and the surrounding buildings slated
for demolition, GMF worked enthusiastically with members
of the Laboriaux community to terrace the site, prepare to
install water tanks, and ready it for planting. Hortas Cariocas
provided a stipend to four local workers, who were employed
to teach food gardening to students from a nearby public
elementary school, where another smaller garden was also
being established as part of the same collaboration. The two
projects were designed to support one another.
However, in August the same year, Rio’s Municipal Sec-
retary of Housing (SMH) bulldozed the garden without any
warning and without consulting stakeholders—community
representatives, residents, the Municipal Department for
the Environment, SEASDH, or GMF. The garden was de-
molished in order to provide a place for the city to park
heavy machinery while continuing to demolish homes and
build walls around the perimeter of the favela (Figure 13).
The event demonstrated a critical lack of communication
and coordination between municipal government depart-
ments, and between state and local government tiers. It
was symbolic of a general disregard toward community
achievements, demonstrated a serious lack of government
oversight, and resulted in a strong multiplier effect. The
incident also pointed to several other principal government
functions that failed the people, including failure to know
and respond appropriately to citizen efforts, failure to pro-
tect community assets, failure to promote responsible land
stewardship, and failure to provide mechanisms to hold gov-
ernment accountable for the consequences of their actions.
President of Laboriaux Residents’ Association, Jose´ Ri-
cardo Duarte Ferreira has many complaints about the lack
of appropriate government action regarding its urbanization
works. He cites that in 2013, Mayor Paes declared that the
Laboriaux’ steep mountainside slopes would be fortified,
and that families at-risk would be relocated. However, the
city only contained the slope and demolished at-risk hous-
ing in areas that faced wealthy neighborboods, while the
city left other properties at environmental risk as they were.
As this demonstrates, the government is in critical need of
establishing good practices when it comes to transparency,
communication, and legitimacy. Obscuring information, or
neglecting to make it accessible internally or to the public,
represents a serious obstruction to governance. It also un-
derscores the need for community-validated programs and
the capacity to build effective, inclusive support for them.
Figure 12. View from the Laboriaux garden.
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Figure 13. Laboriaux garden terraces, prepared for planting (left) and after the SMH moved onto the site (right).
10.5. Macega
Macega is a very poor neighborhood that sits on the upper
rim of Rocinha, lodged against the rockface of the Dois
Irma˜os mountains. Its stunning panoramic views overlook
the Atlantic Ocean, the beachfront skyline of Sa˜o Conrado,
and Rocinha’s entire thatched favela landscape. Macega
is an area of intense spatial and social complexity. The
residents of this neighborhood are some of the poorest and
most at-risk in Rocinha. The primary source of income for
residents comes from burning the plastic coating off wiring
scavenged from trash to access the internal copper core.
There is an abysmal lack of sanitation—not even the open
sewer reaches here. Macega is permanently damp due to
its very narrow lanes and alleys that are overshadowed by
the mountain and receive little sunlight. The only access
the community has to a water supply is through collection
from a natural well in the rockface, which runs dry in the
summer months and overflows to flood the neighborhood
during times of heavy rain. There are no indoor toilets,
so residents must openly defecate. Housing ruins, moun-
tains of trash, and mounds of human and animal feces litter
the area. Macega’s remote location is also known as a
stronghold for drug trafficking. People that live here do so
because they lack an alternative.
Dozens of homes in this area have been demolished by the
municipality under the city’s Morar Carioca program, some be-
cause of the risk of landslide, others in an attempt to displace
traffickers. Despite the destruction of homes, or possibly as a
consequence of it, squatters have moved in to reoccupy the
area, erecting shanties from the demolished housing debris.
Toward the end of 2012, GMF was invited by SEASDH
and the Hortas Cariocas program to work in Macega to co-
produce a large food garden in a massive space that terraces
down the mountainside from the upper edge of the favela
(Figure 14). GMF orchestrated a series of large-scale, on-the-
ground actions to help clear tons of trash from this severely
compromised space. The organization donated tools, seeds,
labor, and produced cultural interventions to aesthetically im-
prove the area. The garden has an orchard and several large
vegetable gardens maintained by a local resident. Neighbor-
hood residents forage for jackfruit and acerola berries here.
It is common for children to climb trees to collect food in the
favelas, but in Macega foraging constitutes a larger part of
their diets. There is a high proportion of children living in this
area, many of whom are undernourished.
Though the physical area of Macega has the potential
to expand into a sizeable and much needed food security
project, the neighborhood is acutely compromised and un-
derserved because of its physical isolation and links to drug
trafficking. Accessing the space is difficult. It requires a ten
to fifteen minute walk either up a steep incline or across the
favela through dangerous and winding becos. This means
it is difficult to bring in materials, take trash out, or even
get to the space quickly, easily or safely. The municipality
eventually withdrew from the project due to these access
issues, and SEASDH due to the heightened security risks
the neighborhood posed.
GMF continued its physical presence in Macega for a
time, but a combination of factors arrested progress. The
UPP police put substantial pressure put on gardeners to re-
veal information about traffickers in the area, which elevated
anxiety for the workers involved. In addition, the lead gar-
dener suffered from mental health problems, which included
delusional behavior that presented in the form of violence and
intimidation toward women [102]. This produced a situation
where two female participants were subject to the threat of
violence, harassment, and acts of aggression, which created
an unhealthy and potentially dangerous work environment
and stifled the ability to develop stable working relationships.
In addition, there is an amplified feeling of state aban-
donment and a historic legacy of violence, murder and dis-
placement in Macega. Drug trafficking murders in the area
still occur with some frequency in the vicinity of the garden.
Early in June 2013, a murder occurred in close proximity
to the garden, and around the same time an unidentified
body part was unearthed in the space. Due to the insta-
bility of the area, and the reality that the presence of GMF
was potentially generating conflict, a decision was made to
eventually end involvement in the area.
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Figure 14. GMF volunteers overlooking the Hortas Cario-
cas Macega garden after a long workday.
The garden and orchard still provide food for the local
community, however Macega remains critically neglected
and underserved. The ADA have resumed control of access
to the area at one major entry point. This location is now
guarded by heavily armed traffickers. Exchanges of gunfire
continue, either due to inter-factional fighting or clashes
with the UPP. At this point in time, access to the upper part
of Macega, where the garden is located, is now restricted
by the Department of Civil Defense.
11. Summary Evaluation: A Landscape of Conflict
and Obstacles
What these attempts at cultivating productive space indicate
is that a lack of one resource or service can partly be com-
pensated by another, but if a multiplicity are compromised,
diverted, or withdrawn, these projects are prone to collapse.
State level contributions (or lack thereof) directed toward
improving natural, social, and capital resources, all play a
crucial role in stabilizing or destabilizing favelas such as
Rocinha. Competition for them also generates a source
of intra-community conflict. A volatile public security land-
scape that not only fails to protect citizens, but actually
leads to elevations in levels of violence, also hinders the
ability of favela communities such as these to stabilize. In-
appropriate and mismanaged State interventions, guided
by non-participatory policy and top-down planning create
insecurity, especially regarding access and rights to land.
Causes of macro-level conflict center around issues of
territorial control. Hegemony over space remains at the
heart of politics in Rocinha. The drug war, exploited for po-
litical interest, is emblematic of this crisis, as is the State’s
attempts to seize territory in the lead up to the Olympics. In
both cases the central goal remains the same, which is to
control access to limited resources.
These projects not only illuminate macro-level obsta-
cles, but also provide a framework for understanding the
micro-level social interfaces that are at play, and the impact
they have on local efforts to make public space productive.
A lack of shared goals, different financial expectations or
dependencies, misappropriation of funds, theft, self-esteem
issues, identity and status are central themes of micro-level
conflict within projects or groups. Unfavorable perceptions
of fellow residents, differing power differentials, a general
lack of trust—toward other community members, govern-
ment and third sector outsiders—and internal power plays
also contribute to creating a sub-level conflict environment.
An inability to decentralize power, the failure to create an
equitable exchange between partners, or to overcome per-
sonality issues, can lead to bad partnership linkages that
can have negative and destructive consequences for all
those involved [103].
12. Policy Considerations
Despite the failures of Rio’s current policy framework,
lessons can still be learned. The State could still offer
Rocinha’s residents the opportunity to become involved in
implementing solutions to the problems they face. Where
environmental protection or rehabilitation is the goal, one
strategy that might prove useful is the adoption of a co-
management system whereby, for example, government
agencies, local individuals, NGOs, and the private sector
collectively participate in processes that promote commu-
nity stewardship of land and ecosystem service protection
by providing incentives to residents.
Informal sector environmental governance systems have
been proven effective in a variety of contexts internation-
ally (in several instances more effective than government
undertakings) [104]. Government can contribute to poverty
reduction by introducing sources of income generation in
the form of individual stipends, organizational grants, tax or
service breaks that incentivize stewardship [105] and pro-
vide tangible benefits to recipients. Micro-credit or solidarity
financing could also be offered to enterprises that engage in
sustainable resource use or direct use forms of ER. Some
of these frameworks already exist in one form or another in
Brazil [106], and could be adapted to favela needs, however
the majority are currently geared toward benefiting State
interests, rather than the poor, and most still fail to reach
those who need support most [107]. Furthermore, attempt-
ing to alleviate poverty through rewarding environmental
stewardship efforts is a complex undertaking. For example,
attaching overly bureaucratized regularization conditions to
financial remuneration packages or subsidies may frustrate
individual agency and impede the already stressed decision-
making apparatus of people and organizations struggling to
function in poverty.
One inclusive measure that could be integrated into
Rio’s urban master plan is the provisioning of spaces for
community gardens, urban agriculture, and the protection
or expansion of green space in favelas. This would create a
scaffolding to grow a semi-autonomous, internally managed
favela network where sustainability plays a central role. This
long-term view for cultivating multidimensional sustainability
[108] is reflective of the kind of integrative policy that Rio so
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often promotes but does little to support. The protection or
remediation of public urban space can only become sustain-
able if the coming together of local stakeholders cooperate
to develop and implement mutually beneficial community
management strategies. This requires municipal-level, criti-
cal infrastructure investment, capital infusion, and access
to a range of resources from training in natural and cul-
tural resource management to solidarity financing. Several
incentives worldwide provide regional policy support for
community ecosystem protection and environmental stew-
ardship through initiatives such scholarships, employment,
and financial compensation [109].
By and large, however, Rio’s rapid urban intervention poli-
cies, rather than alleviating the multiple crises that the city’s
informal sectors face, have multiplied the vulnerabilities and
inequalities that confront the people living in Rocinha and
other urban favelas that are subject to the State’s interven-
tionist policies. As competition for resources inside favelas
becomes increasingly accelerated by government seizures,
population increases, climate change, ecosystem services
scarcity, an absence of productive public space, and an ever-
growing built density—inclusive and multi-dimensional crisis
management efforts must be authentically put in place. Yet,
while data, visibility, and discourse are building to reveal the
extent of these needs, Rio’s interventions have failed to take
on these problems in any logical or meaningful way. In theory,
a socio-environmental strategy such as micro-gardening is a
viable concept to realize in Rocinha, but with the chronic lack
of social cohesion and stability, and the inadequacies of State
intervention, and with vast amounts of state dispensed, fed-
eral money disappearing and leaving projects unfinished, this
remains far from practically achievable. A number of factors
have undermined the ability to deliver any significant social
provisioning. These include weak state capacity and lack
of transparency among government and corporate entities,
failure to prioritize community needs, a lack of vision or sup-
port for local environmental restoration efforts, inappropriate
government oversight that fails to deliver quality infrastructure,
and the general neglect of the needs of the people.
13. Conclusion
This paper aims to illuminate on how institutions such as
the economy, the legal system, and the State are currently
influencing the struggle between the politics of imposed
identity and the politics of self-positioning inside Rocinha.
If serious policy and judicial reform were undertaken, Rio
could initiate inclusive socio-environmental programs to
bring improvements to the lives of favela residents. How-
ever, transparency is lacking in several dimensions and
reform is unlikely. As things stand, access to useful and
relevant information remains obscured; citizens and local
stakeholder groups are not consulted or taken seriously;
there is little effort on the part of the government to learn
from or communicate openly or comprehensively with cit-
izens or citizen groups; and there is a lack of vision to
prioritize sustained efforts that add value to public space.
Effective governance enables citizen participation, and
citizen participation is a key indicator of effective gover-
nance. But good governance requires promoting citizens’
rights and enabling two-way communication between citi-
zens and government [110]. Yet, as this research demon-
strates, delivering inclusivity and social protection to the
informal sector has less to do with policy agenda-setting
and implementation than with politics and profit.
This paper reveals the aggravated frustrations that in-
volve cultivating productive green space inside Rio’s largest
and most densely populated urban favela at a time of great
upheaval. It exposes how State intervention is framed
through the current policy of pacification, and is associ-
ated with territorial control and access to land. As well, it
describes some of the reasons why community projects,
such as the efforts to establish the gardens described, are
so difficult to sustain.
In Rio and elsewhere, pressure is building on the grow-
ing need to develop socio-environmental policy that ad-
dresses resource inequity, especially in areas of poverty
[111]. The inclusive co-production of cared for, green public
space is integral to the generation of solution-oriented nar-
ratives and texts that can encourage critical thinking around
interventions in favelas—about how they are defined and
how they impact communities. Images and perceptions of
poverty are often narrowly focused on economic prosper-
ity, with little value placed on other forms of wealth. So-
cial practices such as building gardens can challenge this
perception. Community mobilization and action can stimu-
late different views, challenge bias, and cultivate a sense
of community ownership that can be seen as fragments
of what E.P. Thompson conceptualized as a ‘moral econ-
omy’ [112]. The theory of a moral economy encompasses
self-affirming behaviors, attitudes and beliefs of excluded
peoples in response to social justice issues that relate to
their local environment and economy.
The projects such as the ones discussed in this pa-
per also draw attention to the local, citizen-centered so-
cial agreements that are being structured to address the
socio-environmental needs of Rocinha residents. They are
indicative of a diverse range of coalitions that have the po-
tential to foster capacity building and social protection, even
though some may fail. These efforts are suggestive of the
types of resistance strategies that occur when local sub-
sistence is threatened or abused by State or market forces
[113]. They also point to the reality of how State interven-
tion plays out on the ground, whether it be in the form of
formalized service delivery, housing regulation policy, or
public security actions—that State intervention is focused
on building the capacity of the State, not the informal sector,
and any meaningful legitimization of public policy in regards
to improvements offered to Rocinha residents has yet to be
effectively proved.
Further, it connects how the promise of global capital
reward, exaggerated by Rio’s investment in transforming
itself into a mega-event city, has shaped its urban policy
landscape to dramatically affect the city’s favelas at this
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moment in the 21st century. The speculative lure of return
generated by Rio’s mega-events not only bites into both the
molar dimensions of globalization, but likewise exerts great
influence over molecular politics inside favela communities.
It is to be expected that controversy will arise in regard
to developing any project in a favela. Working in conflict
touches on deeply embedded views and attitudes. It is cru-
cial to have a clear understanding of why and how to take a
particular approach within a particular context, and to what
ends. It is also essential to consider if there is real benefit
to a community, or if there are adequate safety measures in
place to be able to work without putting people at risk.
Yet despite the insurmountable challenges, as physical
platforms for producing public space, the gardens discussed
in this paper do deserve some merit. They provided some
food insecurity relief and bolstered nutrition uptake for a
handful of beneficiaries. They attracted biodiversity where
before there was none. They reduced the presence of trash,
improved air quality, and reduced vermin infestations. They
were able to catalyze some basic level of network-building
and joint collaboration. They brought therapeutic benefits
to those involved. And increased community awareness of
how desireable public space could be produced, and high-
lighted the DIY potential of cultivating productive green space.
In addition, they provided productive community activity for
the unemployed, created knowledge exchange opportunities,
promoted intergenerational and cross-cultural interactions,
and fostered inclusivity and a culture of collective, community-
led management. However, the outcomes were often con-
tradictory, and all in all, implied that any hope of effectively
producing citizen-centered green space needs to be given
much higher levels of sustained support for it to bring any
real benefits to the residents of Rio’s urban favelas [114].
To foster a decent quality of life for growing favela popu-
lations, and put favelas on a solid and sustainable footing,
business subsidies, social investment, and economic in-
centives must be redirected to reflect resident priorities.
This means addressing issues such as land tenure security,
solidarity and capacity building, poverty alleviation, stable
ecosystem service access, education, sanitation, and so
on—rather than focusing on policies that are driven by the
politics of development interests and enforced through mili-
tary occupation and dispossession.
This requires good governance that views multiple di-
mensions of human security—economic stability, poverty
reduction, social development, ecological sustainability, and
a living environment free of armed conflict as interconnected
goals. At a local level, this means forming meaningful oper-
ational links between formal and informal institutions. On
all levels (government, judicial, corporate and civil) this
requires eliminating undue influence and corruption and
creating a method for independently investigating various
forms of misconduct.
The benefits of engaging in environmental restoration
activities in Rocinha are attractive, but these activities are
unstable and temporary at best. Until government reform
is undertaken, and inclusivity prioritized, abandonment, op-
pression, insecurity and fear will largely determine the way
people perceive of institutional intervention. In all likelihood,
this will continue to obstruct favela residents from having
any high expectations of rights, or looking to the State to
alleviate their problems.
Undertaking the difficult task of building a better future
for the city’s poorer residents is especially complex and diffi-
cult in large favelas like Rocinha. Land tenure security, drug
trafficking, police brutality, and other issues related to terri-
torialism are all stressors. Therefore it is imperative that the
social and moral insolvencies of Rio’s current policy approach
be confronted. Comprehensive changes that refocus on pro-
viding decent socio-economic opportunities for residents and
improving their general living conditions are interconnected
goals that can be brought closer together by efforts that
support citizen-centered sustainability initiatives, build green
infrastructure, and cultivate safe social space [115].
The opportunity for favelas to become a model for in-
tegrating the ecological, socio-economic, planning and po-
litical realms may be incapacitated by the State however
insights that point to the linkages between ecology and ur-
ban design can still be gleaned. Environmental restoration
as an urban design experiment is a platform whereby po-
litical, ecological and social outcomes can be analyzed to
determine how the power relations between favela commu-
nities and State institutions can draw the strands of ecology,
planning, and informality together, or push them apart. Ac-
knowledging the role that spatial and social heterogeneity
play in both ecological and social functioning of urban fave-
las is essential to understanding the potential integrating
power of community-led ER activities, the socio-ecological
patch dynamics of these communities, the value and con-
flict generated by spatial sub-community mosaics, and the
recognition that favelas comprise of a myriad of adaptable
socio-political systems in which people respond to, and can
affect ecological change.
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